In an overlapping generations maximization framework with consumers, whose information on uncertain future income realizations is front-loaded, a closed form aggregate consumption function with CRRA preferences is derived. To have a closed form solution we assume that consumers solve their...

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

I derive a social planner's optimal information design in an environment with quasi-hyperbolic discounting consumers without commitment. Consumption induces instantaneous utility, but unknown delayed cost. Consumers may or may not acquire additional costless information on the cost parameter....

We study optimal contracting by a monopolistic seller of an investment good to a time-inconsistent consumer and, in doing so, introduce asymmetric information to the model of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). We find: (1) the below-marginal-cost-pricing rule may fail for a low-value consumer;...