We show that asset opacity can improve the efficiency of investment in the economy. We consider a model where underinvestment arises from speculative cash-hoardings aiming to benefit from fire-sale prices. Whereas opacity provides no benefit to asset originators in the case of isolated...

We study the interaction between productive investment and persuasion activities in a principal-agent setting with strategic disclosure. In an attempt to persuade the principal, the agent diverts substantial resources from productive activities to information acquisition for persuasion, even...

This paper examines cost behaviour in the municipal setting and finds evidence of cost stickiness. Furthermore, as municipals in New Zealand are required to produce forecasts, it allows us to investigate whether asymmetric cost behaviour is incorporated into forecasts. We document an asymmetric...

How does information asymmetry between firms regarding the quality (ability) of workers, determine the distribution of workers' qualities in those firms? We build a game theoretic model of information asymmetry between 2 representative firms competing in the labor market for labor inputs. In the...

We aim at some simple theoretical underpinnings for a complex empirical question studied by labor economists and others: does Information-technology improvement lead to occupational shifts -- toward "information workers" and away from other occupations -- and to changes in the productivity of...

We study a buyer's strategic use of a dual-sourcing option when facing suppliers possessing private information about their disruption likelihood. We solve for the buyer's optimal procurement contract. We show that the optimal contract can be interpreted as the buyer choosing between...