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A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of …-off, a hybrid share auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner, a minimum share, and an option to … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227234
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360
The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to signal strength through their bids, to the benefit of the innovator. In the present paper we examine whether revealing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378352
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231626
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059473
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973809
shill bidding in strategy-proof auctions more generally. As a remedy, this paper considers an ascending auction with a … random ending time --- a so-called candle auction. Time is discrete and in every round, the bidders bid sequentially and in a … fixed order. The bidder with the highest bid at the end of the decisive round wins the auction and pays her bid. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227449
I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010501453
strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This … feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491761