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Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games

Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2010

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189386

Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting

Deb, Joyee - 2016

Reputation concerns can discipline agents to take costly effort and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are … not always observed? We consider a model of reputation with shifting observability, and ask how this affects agents … reputation incentives and encourage effort. If an agent anticipates that outcomes may not be observed in the future, the benefits …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990092

Signaling with Private Monitoring

Cisternas, Gonzalo - 2020

signaling that arises when beliefs are public. Applications to models of leadership, reputation, and trading are examined …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826845

Signaling with private monitoring

Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron - 2021

reputation are examined. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012797860

Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - 2013

When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212662

Signaling with Private Monitoring

Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron - 2022

reputation are examined …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013310444

Reputation and Screening in a Noisy Environment with Irreversible Actions

Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2020

We introduce a class of two-player dynamic games to study the effectiveness of screening in a principal-agent problem. In every period, the principal chooses either to irreversibly stop the game or to continue, and the agent chooses an action if the principal chooses to continue. The agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832336

Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations

Athey, Susan; Miller, David A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 3, pp. 299-354

We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702316

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852

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