We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm that provides a non-marketed output based on multiple substitutable inputs. The regulator is able to observe the effectiveness of the provision, but faces information asymmetries with respect to the efficiency of the firm’s activities. Motivated...

A cooperative game theoretic framework is introduced to study the behavior of cooperating and competing electrical energy providers considering price-preference rational consumers. We analyze the interactions of generators in an idealized environment described by a DC load flow model where the...

This paper is an empirical investigation of how traders react to public news in a market where there are lots of non-scheduled announcements, often arriving simultaneously. Using detailed trade information from the Nordic intra-day electricity market and GARCH models, this paper examines market...

We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing....

The capacity of the transmission network determines the extent of integration of a multinational energy market. Cross-border externalities render coordination of network maintenance and investments across countries valuable. Is it then optimal to collect powers in the hands of a single...

This paper proposes an incentive mechanism for transmission expansion planning. The mechanism is a bilevel program. The upper level is a profit-maximizing transmission company (Transco) which expands its transmission system while endogenously predicts and influences the generation investment....