This paper estimates to what extent proxy advice allows funds to vote as if they were informed. A fund’s vote is classified as “informed“ if the fund accessed the company’s proxy statement from the SEC’s Edgar website prior to voting. A fund’s proxy advisor, if any, is identified...

We study how beliefs about firm value respond to public information stemming from either public announcements or shareholder meetings. We focus on settings with homogeneous shareholders (i.e., agents with common preferences and opinions), where information is about which course of action is best...

We study the possibility of peace when two countries fight a war over the ownership of a resource. War is always the outcome of the game played by rational countries - under complete or asymmetric information - when there is no pre-established distribution of the resource among countries. When...

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees...

We demonstrate that a candidate competing in an asymmetric Tullock election contest may prefer that their rival candidate has access to information they themselves do not have. In the model, the extent of asymmetry between the candidates is ex-ante uncertain, but candidates can acquire...

This study investigates the role of independent board members in insider-controlled firms by examining the effectiveness of independent boards in reducing information asymmetry in family versus non-family firms. We show a negative relation between the proportion of independent directors and...

I model the choice between a negotiated block trade and a public tender offer as means of acquiring control in a firm with a large minority blockholder. Potential acquirers differ in their (privately known) value-creation ability. In equilibrium, block trades are made by lower ability acquirers...