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We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350
We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short …-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players …-run player's current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation fails. This is because the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393
monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but … one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007814
gradually builds up her reputation. Principal provides full information in every period as long as he has always observed his …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011609923
This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012111150
I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series … uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct … ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909525
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