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Mediation and Strategic Delay in Bargaining
Back, Kerry; Barton, Paul - 2021
Mediator proposals can accelerate agreement and increase welfare even if the mediator is entirely uninformed. We demonstrate this by adding random mediation to the Cramton (1992) bargaining model. Mediation increases welfare by pooling types, which reduces signaling costs. When mediation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240900
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Wars of conquest and independence
Hodler, Roland; Yektaş, Hadi - 2013
nothing if it loses. We study a model of war with such an asymmetric payoff structure, and private information about military … win the war unless its expected military technology is considerably worse. Our model may thus explain why defending …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754525
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Automated Multilateral Negotiation on Multiple Issues with Private Information
Zheng, Ronghuo - 2019
In this paper, we propose and analyze a distributed negotiation strategy for a multi-agent multi-attribute negotiation in which the agents have no information about the utility functions of other agents. We analytically prove that, if the zone of agreement is non-empty and the agents concede up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903886
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Transparency of Outside Options in Bargaining
Hwang, Ilwoo - 2016
We study the effect of the transparency of outside options in bilateral bargaining. A seller posts prices to screen a buyer over time, and the buyer may receive an outside option at a random time. We consider two information regimes: one in which the arrival of the outside option is public and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005787
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When Knowledge Isn't Power : Asymmetric Information, Probabilistic Deceit Detection and Threats in Ultimatum Bargaining
Ferreira, Mark - 2016
for how exchange can be facilitated by mechanisms that detect deceit and/or enable buyer communication in markets where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003880
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One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773
A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276
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Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
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Bargaining with binary private information
Dilmé, Francesc - 2024
This paper studies bargaining between a seller and a buyer with binary private valuation. Because the setting is more tractable than the case of general valuation distributions (studied in Gul et al., 1986), we are able to explicitly construct the full set of equilibria via induction. This lets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014502278
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Settlement under the threat of conflict : the cost of asymmetric information
Sjöberg, Eric - 2014
I study a situation where two players disagree on the division of a good. In the first of two stages, the players can divide the good peacefully between them by signing a contract. If either or both players reject the contract, they must engage in a costly contest over the good. One of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337007
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Bargaining and conflict with up-front investments : how power asymmetries matter
Schaller, Zachary; Skaperdas, Stergios - 2019
We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non …-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is … efficient ex post, but we show that a player may prefer Conflict ex ante if there are sufficient asymmetries in strength. There …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012156576