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When there is strategic complementarity and all agents have access to public information, but only a subset of them has access to private information, strategic complementarity within the subset of privately-informed agents enhances the focal power of public information. This results to an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212159
In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents’ knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873501
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720732
There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most recent turmoil in the domestic and global markets is due to a failure in our regulatory system. Yet, Congress has not supported comprehensive regulation related to the day-to-day activities of mortgage brokers and their relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199708
If Anne knows more than Bob about the state of the world, she may or may not know what Bob thinks, but it is always possible that she does. In other words, if the distribution of Anne's belief about the state is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of Bob's belief, we can construct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012847880
This study experimentally investigates the role of two-sided cheap talk in decisions under asymmetric information. Unlike previous studies, our study also considers endogenous investment timing. In our experiments, subjects play two-player global games with asymmetric information. Before making...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849211
This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029291
This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324859
One apparent reason for deferring a decision – abstaining from choosing, leaving the decision open to be taken by someone else, one’s later self, or nature – is for lack of sufficient confidence in the relevant beliefs. This paper develops an axiomatic theory of decision in situations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010501389
This article develops a Bayesian persuasion model examining a manager's incentives to gather information when the manager can disseminate this information selectively to interested parties (“users”) and when the objectives of the manager and the users are not perfectly aligned. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854767