This article studies the strategic use of collective negotiation in multiplaintiff litigation. Compared with one-on-one negotiation, collective negotiation can change the distribution of per-plaintiff damages in a manner that influences the defendant's bargaining incentive. Informational...

Under asymmetric information, dishonest sellers lead to market unraveling in the lemons model. An additional cost of dishonesty is that language becomes cheap talk. We develop instead a model where people derive utility from actions (what they say), as well as from outcomes, so talk is costly....

We extend the comparison of experiments in Blackwell (1953) to a strategic setting that both simplifies and expands upon ideas in Gossner (2000). We introduce a partial order on correlating signals, called more strategically informative, and prove that it is equivalent to the partial order more...

We propose a criterion of stability for two-sided markets with asymmetric information. A central idea is to formulate matching functions, off-path beliefs conditional on counterfactual pairwise deviations, and on-path beliefs in the absence of such deviations. A matching-belief configuration is...

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...