We exploit exogenous variation in the amount of public information available to banks about a firm to empirically evaluate the importance of adverse selection in the credit market. A 2006 reform introduced by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) reduced the amount of public information available to...

This paper attempts to investigate the impact of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash risk. Using a sample of 1,402 listed-banks in 55 countries for the period 2005-2013, we show that credit information sharing through public credit registries is negatively associated...

We show that mutual funds use information acquired by participating in the equity lending market to make portfolio allocation decisions. Using data from German mutual funds on their stock-level lending decisions, we find that funds lending shares are more likely to exit positions relative both...

Do rating announcements reduce information asymmetries? We investigate the effect of rating disclosures on the volatility and liquidity of the US bond market. Although rating agencies' decisions often are anticipated by credit spread changes, we show that in the case of no regulatory change...

Market design matters when heterogeneous borrowers roll over loans, facing funding shocks. Borrower anonymity is a key feature of various financial markets, such as short term, interbank lending markets. We show that anonymous markets experience systemic runs for large shocks, but provide...

Can banks trade credit default swaps (CDSs) referenced on their current corporate clients at competitive prices, or are banks penalized for potentially holding private information? To answer this question we merge CDS trades reported under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)...