This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their … neighbors in the network. I derive a closed expression for the (interim) social welfare loss that depends on the initial … information structure and on the possible pieces of information that can be gathered under the network. Then, I explore how …

, when signals are correlated, the empty network may not be pairwise stable when the number of firms and/or correlation are …, incomplete and irregular network can be stable, with firms observing high variance signals acting as "critical nodes". Finally …

opposing forces: network effects and informational interdependencies. I show that two privacy enhancements — reducing the …

, we construct an information-network model incorporating both information transmitters and information aggregators. Given … network equilibrium, its optimality and the patterns of equilibrium and optimal configuration. We then allow for endogenous … costs, the monocentric network with one aggregator connecting to all other agents as transmitters on a tree graph is the …

one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …

one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders equilibrium …