We investigate the impact of vertical price restraints on the free-entry equilibrium and its welfare properties in a vertically related market where manufacturer-retailer hierarchies compete under asymmetric information. We compare the legal regimes of laissez-faire and ban on resale price...

We investigate the incentive for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when the retailers are privately informed about their production costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. Partial vertical integration...

The paper considers an infinitely repeated competition between vertical manufacturer-retailer hierarchies. In every period, retailers privately observe the demand, consequently manufacturers pay retailers “information rents”. I compare between several collusive equilibria that differ in the...

Information Technology has allowed vertically related firms to share sales forecasts, production schedules, inventory, etc. This fact motivated many studies on how the retailer’s superior knowledge of market conditions affects pricing and competition within different vertical restraints. But...

With imperfect private monitoring, a firm selling two experience goods can increase both producer and consumer surplus by bundling. Bundling constrains consumers to buy two products, making consumers better informed and ensuring that they use tougher punishment strategies. Both increased...

While there are suggestions in applied cartel studies that price dispersion changes when cartelization of a market occurs, there are few theoretical or empirical analyses of this effect. This paper surveys the thin economic literature on the link between overt collusion and price dispersion....