The well-known subprime mortgage crisis, which began to manifest in early 2007, since when the effects of the speculative bubble begin to become evident from the increase in default rates in residential mortgages, has triggered a global crisis that has pushed various legislations over time to...

Decisions to donate time or money for charitable purposes are typically seen as make-or-buy decisions, implying that there should be a clear distinction between individuals engaging in one of these two forms of giving and that this distinction should be somehow linked to opportunity costs. But...

The past and current reluctance of firms and individuals to use private enforcement suggests that there are limited incentives for self-help. The key contribution of private enforcement to overall deterrence derives from cases which would not otherwise be brought, not simply because of resource...

Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows that litigation can be the outcome of rational behavior by a litigant and her attorney. If the attorney has more information than his client concerning the characteristics of the lawsuit, the...

This paper develops a game-theoretic model that explores the use of costly signals in a litigation environment with private information held by the plaintiff. I compare the costly signaling model with the canonical models of settlement through screening (Bebchuk 1984) and settlement signaling...

We develop a signaling model of final offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a proposal to an arbitrator and if no agreement is reached, the arbitrator must select one of the two submitted...

We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may...

I examine the incentives and effort choices of lawyers that reflect their anticipation that those perceived as high-talent lawyers will be able to command higher fees in future contracts they are offered by the observers of their effort levels. The analysis employs three versions of a two-type...