informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …

I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of … can arise in equilibrium. Elaborations are proposed to shed light on why non-trivial communication protocols are used in …

function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel …

identical for both sender and receiver. Additionally, the sender incurs a communication cost which is increasing in the … applied to the case where communication is costless but preferences diverge. Additionally, we model the competency of the … decreasing in the likelihood of the mistake. When the preferences between players diverge and when there are communication costs …

This paper investigates an extended version of Crawford-Sobel's (1982) communication game in which the principal can …-Sobel's most informative equilibrium and optimal delegation. We then study multi-stage communication. This modification results in … truth-telling communication at every stage. Finally, we construct a mechanism in which approximately full information is …

. Our findings reveal that project correlation leads to these biases countervailing each other, facilitating the …, our study suggests limited benefits in the context of project correlation. …