Asymmetric information between lender and borrower is made responsible for financing constraints at the firm level which may influence real activity. In this paper a standard model of credit rationing due to adverse selection and adverse incentive effects is used to derive hypotheses on causes...

Beschreibung der Bedeutung von Vertrauensgütermärkten mit Einbettung in die ökonomischen Darstellungen von Gütern -- Untersuchung von Betrug und Effizienz in Vertrauensgütermärkten mit heterogenen Kunden -- Untersuchung des optimalen strategischen Verhaltens von Experten und Kunden. .

On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...