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We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382050
We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013388842
trustworthiness on the side of the expert. However, a great amount of empirical and experimental papers document for a range of … determinants of trust and trustworthiness in experimental credence goods markets, namely the effect of a health frame (versus a … higher willingness of consumers (patients) to enter the market. Trustworthiness, as measured by the provision and charging …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591151
Recent research in contract theory on the effects of behavioral biases implicitly assumes that they are stable, in the sense of not being affected by the contracts themselves. In this paper, we provide evidence that this is not necessarily the case. We show that in an insurance context, being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011812974
Recent research in contract theory on the effects of behavioral biases implicitly assumes that they are stable, in the sense of not being affected by the contracts themselves. In this paper, we provide evidence that this is not necessarily the case. We show that in an insurance context, being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899247
We study trust building in credence goods markets in a dynamic setting. An extreme lemon problem arises in the one-shot game and results in no trade. In the repeated game, an expert's honesty is monitored through consumers' rejection of his recommendations. We characterize the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932973
We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
Although it is generally accepted that consumer confidence measures are informative signals about the state of the economy, theoretical macroeconomic models designed for the analysis of monetary policy typically do not provide a role for them. I develop a framework with asymmetric information in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012269096
Do individuals anticipate present bias in others? This paper jointly investigates beliefs about one's own and others' present bias. In an online experiment, participants engaged in a real-effort task display little awareness of their own present bias, but anticipate present bias in others....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936520
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932891