This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …. -- Signaling ; job markets ; education ; employer learning ; intuitive criterion …

the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an …

/DiNardo, 1991) or a matching model with on-the-job search and cyclical selection (Hagedorn/Manovskii, 2013). The data suggests that …

understanding unemployment fluctuations in matching models. …

high match-specific productivity. The key implications of our model hold in data from the NLSY79, where information about …

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …

source of information for internal versus external promotions. By contrast, formal vocational degrees and initial job task …