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Campaigns and political competition
Gersbach, Hans - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000806554
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The money-burning refinement : with an application to a political signalling game
Gersbach, Hans - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 33 (2004) 1, pp. 67-87
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002505772
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Designing democracy : ideas for better rules
Gersbach, Hans - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002116346
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Competiton of politicians for wages and office
Gersbach, Hans - In: Social choice and welfare 32 (2009) 4, pp. 533-553
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824442
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Campaigns, political mobility, and communication
Gersbach, Hans - 2009
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539
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Incentive contracts and elections for politicians and the down-up problem
Gersbach, Hans - In: Advances in economic design : with 28 tables, (pp. 65-76). 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871679
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Competition of politicians for wages and office
Gersbach, Hans - In: Social choice and welfare 33 (2009) 1, pp. 51-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873208
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An appraisal of history-bound
Gersbach, Hans - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445327
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Campaigns, political mobility, and communication
Gersbach, Hans - In: Public choice 161 (2014) 1/2, pp. 31-49
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479664
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Campaigns, political mobility, and communication
Gersbach, Hans - 2011 - This version: January 2011
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009236280