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This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles in organizations depend on the prevailing wage-setting conditions for workers. In particular, we examine a leader who can -- in addition to the use of monetary incentives -- motivate a worker by adopting leadership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012114746
This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264549
This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles in organizations depend on the prevailing wage-setting conditions for workers. In particular, we examine a leader who can - in addition to the use of monetary incentives - motivate a worker by adopting leadership styles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012141074
Why do some leaders use praise as a means to motivate workers, while other leaders use social punishment? This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles depend on the prevailing labor-market conditions for workers. We show that the existence of a binding wage floor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012497761
Why do some leaders use praise as a means to motivate workers, while other leaders use social punishment? This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles depend on the prevailing labor-market conditions for workers. We show that the existence of a binding wage floor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012504524
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agents effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, promo-tion tournaments and individual performance pay need to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005857929
This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807867