Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 45,519
Cover Image
Job market signaling and employer learning
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Prat, Julien - 2008
This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268897
Cover Image
Job market signaling and employer learning
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos (contributor); Prat, Julien (contributor) - 2008
This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …. -- Signaling ; job markets ; education ; employer learning ; intuitive criterion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003652697
Cover Image
Labour market screening with intermediaries
Schweinzer, Paul - 2006
the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366528
Cover Image
Wage rigidity and job creation
Häfke, Christian; Sonntag, Marcus; Rens, Thijs van - 2009
. -- Wage Rigidity ; Search and Matching Model ; Business Cycle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003827155
Cover Image
Wage Rigidity and Job Creation
Haefke, Christian - 2007
Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) have documented the failure of standard labor market search models to match business cycle fluctuations in employment and unemployment. They argue that it is likely that wages are not adjusted as regularly as suggested by the model, which would explain why...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729156
Cover Image
Wage Rigidity and Job Creation
Haefke, Christian; Sonntag, Marcus; van Rens, Thijs - 2021
Standard macroeconomic models underpredict the volatility of unemployment fluctuations. A common solution is to assume wages are rigid. We explore whether this explanation is consistent with the data. We show that the wage of newly hired workers, unlike the aggregate wage, is volatile and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324956
Cover Image
Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Prat, Julien - 2021
This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324859
Cover Image
Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions
Bossler, Mario; Grunau, Philipp - 2016
source of information for internal versus external promotions. By contrast, formal vocational degrees and initial job task …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011448114
Cover Image
Screening with multitasking
Dinerstein, Michael; Opper, Isaac M. - 2022
What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332099
Cover Image
Screening with Multitasking
Dinerstein, Michael; Opper, Isaac M. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334527