This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …. -- Signaling ; job markets ; education ; employer learning ; intuitive criterion …

the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an …

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …

source of information for internal versus external promotions. By contrast, formal vocational degrees and initial job task …

provide a framework with microeconomic foundations that give rise to matching frictions, which can be used to understand the … indeed, more frequently used aggregate matching technology. Existing differences turn out to be crucial for the empirical …

We propose a criterion of stability for two-sided markets with asymmetric information. A central idea is to formulate … matching functions, off-path beliefs conditional on counterfactual pairwise deviations, and on-path beliefs in the absence of … such deviations. A matching-belief configuration is stable if the matching is individually rational with respect to the …