This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …. -- Signaling ; job markets ; education ; employer learning ; intuitive criterion …

the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an …

This paper makes two contributions to the empirical matching literature. First, a recent study by Anderson and Burgess … (2000) testing for endogenous competition among job seekers in a matching framework, is replicated with a richer and more … accurate data set for Germany. Their results are confirmed and found to be surprisingly robust. Second, the matching framework …

This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …

source of information for internal versus external promotions. By contrast, formal vocational degrees and initial job task …

This paper makes two contributions to the empirical matching literature. First, a recent study by Anderson and Burgess … (2000) testing for endogenous competition among job seekers in a matching frame-work, is replicated with a richer and more … accurate data set for Germany. Their results are confirmed and found to be surprisingly robust. Second, the matching framework …