This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive...

Optimal wage indexation, as derived by Gray, was subject to criticism due to a lack of efficient use of information; failure to clear the market which resulted in non-optimal contracts; and the lack of an explicit use of welfare criteria. The purpose of this paper is to derive a wage contract...

Optimal wage indexation, as derived by Gray, was subject to criticism due to a lack of efficient use of information; failure to clear the market which resulted in non-optimal contracts; and the lack of an explicit use of welfare criteria. The purpose of this paper is to derive a wage contract...

We study the Lemons Problem when workers have private information on both their skills and their intrinsic motivation for the job offered by firms in the labor market. We first show that, when workers are motivated, inefficiencies due to adverse selection are mitigated. More interestingly,...