We propose a model where forecasters have access to noisy signals about the future (forward information). In this setting, information varies not only across agents but also across horizons. As a result, estimated persistence of forecasts deviates from persistence of fundamentals and the ability...

We relax the assumption of full information that underlies most dynamic general equilibrium models, and instead assume agents optimally form estimates of the states from an incomplete information set. We derive a version of the Kalman filter that is endogenous to agents' optimising decisions,...

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a...

We investigate the role of economic transparency within the framework of one of Townsend's models of "forecasting the forecasts of others". The equilibrium has the property that "higher order beliefs"; are coordinated into a finite-dimensional setup that is amenable to address monetary policy...