Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008824717
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382752
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012625567
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014553232
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014375344
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133090
In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock's rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064469
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof’s setting, sellers are better in- formed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013216168
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof’s setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250025