When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...

Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is...

We study an economy in which large technology companies, Big Techs (BTs), provide credit to firms operating on their platforms. We focus on two advantages that BTs have with respect to banks: better information on their clients and better enforcement of credit repayment since BTs can exclude a...

A principal hires an agent to learn about the cost of a project (experimentation) and then to execute it (production). The agent is privately informed about the probability that the cost is low, with the high-type agent being relatively more optimistic than the low type. The agent also engages...