"We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property … rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent … with outsiders' expectations based on publicly available information rather than true income, resulting in an observed …

U-shaped function of his reputation for accuracy: being perceived as more precise allows to attract more good sellers … but a high expected precision also deters bad sellers. Since the certifier tries to reach a balanced reputation to attract … both types, reputation has a disciplining effect when the certifier is perceived as insufficiently accurate, but gives …

monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but … one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this …

Reputation concerns can discipline agents to take costly effort and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are … not always observed? We consider a model of reputation with shifting observability, and ask how this affects agents … reputation incentives and encourage effort. If an agent anticipates that outcomes may not be observed in the future, the benefits …