In this paper the role of information asymmetries between regions and a centralized authority is analyzed. In a model with inter-regional externalities due to capital mobility and a source-based tax instrument, we first derive conditions for which the optimum can be implemented by an adequately...

We analyze tax competition between large and asymmetric countries and derive conditions under which countries assist foreign authorities in collecting tax revenues via information exchange. It turns out that voluntary exchange of information is a Nash equilibrium between asymmetric countries,...

In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in...

In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered...

In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a separation may increase efficiency. We show that efficiency can be...