Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 2,417
Cover Image
Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
Cover Image
Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns
Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017
counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
Cover Image
One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773
A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276
Cover Image
Asymmetric power and market failure : power hazard in exchange
Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2016
In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435708
Cover Image
Information Asymmetry and Incentives for Active Management
Kim, Min S. - 2010
This paper presents a model in which fund managers choose between active management and passive management when investors cannot directly observe managers' efforts and skills. In an equilibrium skilled managers actively manage their funds only when skills can add a large value in active...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135435
Cover Image
What to put on and what to keep off the Table? A Politician's Choice of which Issues to address
Sayag, Rei S.; Swank, Otto H. - 2012
At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda setting, we develop a model in which a politician has to decide whether or not to address a public issue. Addressing an issue means that the politician investigates the issue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326387
Cover Image
Signalling with career concerns
Chung, Kim-Sau; Eső, Péter - 2007
Consider an agent (manager, artist, etc.) who has imperfect private information about his productivity. At the beginning of his career (period 1, short run"), the agent chooses among publicly observable actions that generate imperfect signals of his productivity. The actions can be ranked...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271972
Cover Image
Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Hahn, Volker - 2010
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753200
Cover Image
What to put on and that to keep off the table? A politician's choice of which issues to address
Sayag, Rei S.; Swank, Otto H. - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724339
Cover Image
Sequential aggregation of verifiable information
Hahn, Volker - 2010 - This version: September 2010
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008748176