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"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553
observing the supervisor's effort, reducing the supervisor's incentives to shirk. Thus, joint performance evaluation can be … incentives are paramount. Further, with a less accurate performance measure, the principal's preference for a supervisor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036616
The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012715529
The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324885
It is often touted that decisiveness is one of the most important qualities to be possessed by leaders, broadly defined. To see how and why decisiveness can be a valuable asset in organizations, we construct a model of strategic information transmission where: (i) a decision maker solicits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332366
In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver's prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap talk. The point of departure is our explicit focus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332501
This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques à la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608611
and Moore still hold. It is shown that investment incentives are guided by an additional element to standard hold … overinvestment. Although investment incentives are always positive from a social perspective, they can be negative from an individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262108
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263055
We develop a reputation model to study the concurrent use of trademarks and certification for foodproducts with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). The model extendsShapiro’s (1983) approach to modeling reputation to a situation in which two technologies for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360745