Showing 1 - 10 of 20,069
This paper investigates the role of fiat money in decentralized markets, where producers have private information about … the quality of the goods they supply. Money is divisible, terms of trade are determined endogenously, and agents can … finance their consumption with money or with real production. When the fraction of high quality producers in the economy is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014120531
The aim of this paper is to study asset reallocation in financial markets subject to search, bargaining, and … consequence, a positive liquidity differential between money and real assets emerges, resulting in an increased demand for fiat … money, as observed since the eruption of the global financial crisis. A policy intervention replacing information sensitive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011790391
This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary-discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937351
We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806593
This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor's information was public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902729
I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063
A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865067
This paper generalizes a conceptual insight in dynamic contracting with quasilin- ear payoffs: the principal does not need to pay any information rents for extract- ing the agent’s “new” private information obtained after signing the contract. This is shown in a general model in which the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704662
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787097
We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed receivers' actions affect the sender's utility. Given a disclosure rule, the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under the assumption that the sender's expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009419552