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information about the return to transactions with particular agents. In a search framework, signaling supports not simply a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262133
I propose a model of the housing market using a search framework with asymmetric information in which sellers are … posting as a signalling device to direct buyers' search. Adverse selection and inefficient entry on the demand side then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490077
increase in the option value of search: with better ability to differentiate offer quality, workers become choosier and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012795404
recommendations and price offers only after consumers have approached them, creating additional market power due to search costs. In … the expert and fringe firms is costly. For search costs that are not excessively high, in equilibrium the expert … mistakenly leave the expert, and some low-severity consumers incur unnecessary search costs. Total welfare is non-monotonic in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012242146
incurring a positive search cost, the agent can consult an expert, whose interest is partially aligned with him. There are … vanishing search cost. The main findings are as follows. First, there are signal structures with which both the agent's payoff …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104605
are consistent with an increase in the option value of search: with better ability to differentiate offer quality, workers … search longer, select higher-quality intermediaries, and ultimately have better migration experiences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013363679
We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private value. Assuming that the seller adopts Myerson (1981) optimal auction in response, we characterize both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014094506
We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294529
This essay considers the role of reputational information in our marketplace. It explains how well-functioning marketplaces depend on the vibrant flow of accurate reputational information, and how misdirected regulation of reputational information could harm marketplace mechanisms. It then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044069
Consumers heterogeneously possess limited price information: captive consumers may know only one price from a seller, while informed consumers know several prices. We study a homogeneous-good oligopoly where sellers of heterogeneous costs compete on price for heterogeneously limit-informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014255371