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Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs

Bloch, Francis; Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen - 2011

firm must transfer a large part of the surplus to the inactive firm in order to limit pre-emption. Learning; Pre …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409636

Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319

Adverse selection, learning, and competitive search

Mayr, Karin - 2020

(2010). My model allows for an analysis of the effects of firm learning on labor market efficiency in the presence of search … frictions. I find that firm learning increases relative expected earnings in high-ability jobs and, thereby, enhances imitation … priori. Numerical results show that firm learning does not increase labor market efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012306402

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901

Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937

The price of advice

Eső, Péter; Szentes, Balázs - 2004

We develop a model of consulting (advising) where the role of the consultant is that she can reveal signals to her client which refine the client’s original private estimate of the profitability of a project. Importantly, only the client can observe or evaluate these signals, the consultant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273821

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2002

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890

The price of advice

Esö, Péter (contributor); Szentes, Balàzs (contributor) - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780868

Truth or efficiency? Communication in a sequential public good game

Serra-Garcia, Marta (contributor); … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807183

Common agency with informed principals : menus and signals

Galperti, Simone - 2011

I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226

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