Market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating somewhat scarce but unpriced rights and resources, such as air and water. Tradable permits have emerged as the most cost effective measure leading to the emergence of both nationwide (SO2 ) and supranational (CO2 ) emission...

This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk averse and has specific knowledge - knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and...

Investment banks develop their own innovative derivatives to underwrite corporate issues but they cannot preclude other banks from imitating them. However, during the process of underwriting an innovator can learn more than its imitators about the potential clients. Moving first puts him ahead...

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in whichcorporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show thatrms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors usingthe timing of corporate...

This paper develops a tractable real options framework to analyze the eects of asym-metric information on investment and nancing decisions when rms require externalfunds to nance investment. Our analysis shows that corporate insiders can signal theirprivate information to outside investors using...

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of...

Repo markets trade off the efficient allocation of liquidity in the financial sector with resilience to funding shocks. The repo trading and clearing mechanisms are crucial determinants of the allocation-resilience tradeoff. The two common mechanisms, anonymous central-counterparty (CCP) and...

We show that firms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in financial expertise, and that these investments can be destabilizing. Financial expertise in our model improves firms' ability to accurately estimate value when trading a security. It creates adverse selection, which under...