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Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a … communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511713
bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270931
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671657
whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781
model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778541
We study optimal insurance contracts for an agent with Markovian private information. Our main results characterize the implications of constrained efficiency for long-run welfare and inequality. Under minimal technical conditions, there is Absolute Immiseration: in the long run, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012897939
We study optimal insurance contracts for an agent with Markovian private information. Our main results characterize the implications of constrained efficiency for long-run welfare and inequality. Under minimal technical conditions, there is Absolute Immiseration: in the long run, the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931503
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299751
This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information and can sign renegotiable contracts with a neutral third-party. Our aim is to understand whether renegotiation-proof third-party contracts can confer a strategic advantage on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500203