We prove a \no-speculative-trade" theorem under unawareness for the infinite case. This generalizes the result for the …

We generalize the ``No-speculative-trade" theorem for finite unawareness belief structures in Heifetz, Meier, and …

The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff …

bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also …

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a … communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to …

We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have … is applied to finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that honest communication and play of the Pareto …-enforcing. -- efficiency ; communication ; coordination ; honesty ; evolutionary stability …

model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …