Showing 1 - 10 of 1,615
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer ' the seller ' follows from a non-trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003975228
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305719
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748530
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009670390
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362561
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231626
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010236229
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010244724
Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365881
' later signaling their private information to rivals. Due to signaling, equilibrium prices are distorted, and so while firms …, compared with firms that do not attempt to manipulate rivals' beliefs, signaling firms acquire less precise information. An …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548620