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Governments design taxation schemes to capture resource rent. However, they usually propose contracts with limited duration and possess less information on the resources than the extractive firms do. This paper investigates how information asymmetry on costs and an inability to commit to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793580
We study the optimal contracts (payment and extraction path) implemented by a regulator unable to commit to long term contracts that delegates the extraction of a nonrenewable resource to a firm. The regulator wishes to maximize the tax revenue and does not know the firm's efficiency which is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008143
addressing it by focusing on a single simple problem: multiunit auctions. A variety of issues will be discussed: representation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450
The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378352
This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365885
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342227
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore … comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010507805
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore … comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010529939
I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063