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Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games

Chen, Yurong; Deng, Xiaotie; Li, Yuhao - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015154676

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets

Echenique, Federico; Pereyra, Juan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 1-39

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673087

Price setting in a decentralized market and the competitive outcome

Lauermann, Stephan - 2008

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264835

Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome

Lauermann, Stephan - 2018

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219803

Rigidity of Transfers and Unraveling in Matching Markets

Du, Songzi - 2015

We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option of matching early … a stable matching after all agents arrive. We prove that without flexible transfers, as the market gets large, on … average at least one quarter of all agents in period 1 have strict incentives to match early and skip the centralized matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036064

Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets

Romanyuk, Gleb - 2018

Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and sequentially decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919275

Ignorance is Bliss : Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller

Lamping, Jennifer - 2010

In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However … depresses bids. The more matching matters, the greater the penalty associated with observing the matches …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139399

Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity : The Role of Moral Hazard

Costain, James - 2009

This paper studies the cyclical dynamics of Mortensen and Pissarides' (1994) model of job creation and destruction when workers' effort is not perfectly observable, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). An occasionally-binding no-shirking constraint truncates the real wage distribution from below,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157042

Matching for credit : identifying information asymmetries in joint-liability lending

Klein, Thilo - 2024

borrowers matching into groups exposed to similar economic shocks under JL, diminishing its effectiveness. I reconcile …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271329