Firms along the supply chain rely on both public disclosures and private information exchanges to develop forecasts about future performance. In this paper, we examine how a firm’s public and private channels of information sharing with its trading partners affect information spillovers along...

We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments have limited financial commitment and can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit...

This study examines how private firms’ disclosures create information externalities for public firms’ information environment. Exploiting a setting with varying importance of private firms’ financial information, we document that public firms’ forecasted earnings are less accurate and...

We examine whether and how democratic procedures can achieve socially desirable public good provision in the presence of profound uncertainty about the benefits of public goods, i.e., when citizens are able to identify the distribution of benefits only if they aggregate their private...

We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive...