In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be … (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents’ knowledge structure … disassociation under common knowledge (the agents’ types are independent, conditional on some common-knowledge variable). Subjective …

information and game theory. Specifically, how the regulatory failures resulted in mortgage brokers and lenders that were not …

In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be … (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure … disassociation under common knowledge (the agents' types are independent, conditional on some common-knowledge variable). Subjective …

When there is strategic complementarity and all agents have access to public information, but only a subset of them has … access to private information, strategic complementarity within the subset of privately-informed agents enhances the focal … power of public information. This results to an expected social welfare function that is convex in the precision of both …

quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide …. For the case where precise information about social preferences is available, we show that any tension between efficiency …

comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core concepts is also provided. -- differential information economy …

Bayesian Persuasion with asymmetric information vis-à-vis the judge. This mechanism endogenously results in the reorganization …