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Information independence and common knowledge
Gossner, Olivier; Kalai, Ehud; Weber, Robert James - 2009
(statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents’ knowledge structure … disassociation under common knowledge (the agents’ types are independent, conditional on some common-knowledge variable). Subjective … that disassociates types is more informative than any common-knowledge variable. With three or more agents, conditions (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873501
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Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004
We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009728179
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Bayesian Persuasion Mediating Cheap Talk
Sagiev, Erkin - 2020
We study a multi-player model of sequential communication. A receiver obtains information from two sources. The first is cheap talk with a sender, who acquires the information, while the second is Bayesian persuasion with a mediator, who modifies the initial information. We prove that Bayesian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822471
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Information Disclosure in Contests : A Bayesian Persuasion Approach
Zhang, Jun - 2016
We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two-player contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to in uence the uninformed contestant's belief about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989365
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Long information design
Koessler, Frédéric; Laclau, Marie; Renault, Jérôme; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 883-927
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273785
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Interactive information design
Koessler, Frédéric; Laclau, Marie; Tomala, Tristan - 2018
We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When the set of messages available to each designer is finite, such games always admit subgame perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information about independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012115785
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Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information
Kosenko, Andrew - 2018
We study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state independent preferences, and a receiver who has preferences that depend on the unknown state. In a model with two states of the world, over the interesting range of parameters, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912599
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Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001974022
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After the Storm : Asymmetrical Information, Game Theory, and an Examination of the 'Minnesota Model' for National Regulation of Mortgage Brokers and Tomorrow's Predatory Lenders
Ireland, Mark - 2012
There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most recent turmoil in the domestic and global markets is due to a failure in our regulatory system. Yet, Congress has not supported comprehensive regulation related to the day-to-day activities of mortgage brokers and their relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199708
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Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs
Sadzik, Tomasz - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 21 (2021) 2, pp. 489-524
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012593891