We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our …

private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism. …

for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level …

Which decision rule should we use to make a binary collective choice? While voting procedures are applied ubiquitously … qualified majority voting. Our result shows that using a VCG mechanism is not superior to voting in general and justifies the … use of voting mechanisms. It thereby could explain why many decision rules employed in practice do not rely on monetary …

conflicting interests. We show that the set of preferences that allow for the existence of an informative voting equilibrium can … voting threshold value. What's worse, the presence of the public information introduces an inefficient equilibrium which … robustly exists across different voting rules. To mitigate the harmful effect of the public information, we propose to use a …