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Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at … of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto … compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623050
The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
analysis are interesting as such, they may also yield interesting practical implications. -- Bargaining ; Information …We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different … bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824174
/2; if neither offer falls into the interval, there is no settlement. Comparisons are made with other bargaining mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989
maximum amount of information that can be transmitted in equilibrium is increasing in the bargaining power of the Sender … predict that information transmission is increasing in the Sender's relative bargaining power. This prediction is corroborated …We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901
maximum amount of information that can be transmitted in equilibrium is increasing in the bargaining power of the Sender … predict that information transmission is increasing in the Sender's relative bargaining power. This prediction is corroborated …We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386160
how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an …People in inferior bargaining positions are often vaguer when they express their preferences. In this paper, we explain … informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main result is that the maximum amount of information transmission is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653
telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this paper I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293415
We compare the behavior of car mechanics and college students as sellers in experimental credence goods markets. Finding largely similar behavior, we note much more overtreatment by car mechanics, probably due to decision heuristics they learned in their professional training.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294779
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294825