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The social value of transparency and accountability : experimental evidence from asymmetric public good games ; conference paper
Khadjavi, Menusch; Lange, Andreas; Nicklisch, Andreas - 2014
backfires as special agents extract significantly more resources. Introducing a peer punishment mechanism sustains contributions … stigmatization effect for the special agent as he receives substantially more peer punishment while contributions by other agents do … not change. Finally full transparency of all agents actions creates full accountability as it allows targeted punishment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487735
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How transparency may corrupt : experimental evidence from asymmetric public goods games
Khadjavi, Menusch; Lange, Andreas; Nicklisch, Andreas - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 142 (2017), pp. 468-481
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927458
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Asymmetric network monitoring and punishment in public goods experiments
Boosey, Luke; Isaac, R. Mark - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 132 (2016) 1, pp. 26-41
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703082
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Recognizing Contributors and Cost of Information : An Experiment on Public Goods
Samek, Anya - 2014
We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of contributors and cost of information on public good contributions. First, we vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Second, we investigate the effect of imposing a cost on viewing contributors. Recognizing all contributors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063986
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Information defaults in repeated public good provision
Liu, Jia; Sonntag, Axel; Zizzo, Daniel John - 2020
We present an experiment that models a repeated public good provision setting where the policy maker or manager does …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012152475
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Precautionary Incentives for Privately Informed Victims
Clements, Matthew T. - 2002
When one victim's precautions against crime have spillover benefits to other victims, individuals do not take the socially optimal amount of precaution. I explore the use of criminal sanctions as a mechanism to correct this: Criminals are punished based on the level of precaution taken by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105639
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Precautionary Incentives for Privately Informed Victims
Clements, Matthew T. - 2002
When one victim's precautions against crime have spillover benefits to other victims, individuals do not take the socially optimal amount of precaution. I explore the use of criminal sanctions as a mechanism to correct this: Criminals are punished based on the level of precaution taken by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014108904
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On esteem-based incentives
Mazyaki, Ali; Weele, Joël J. van der - 2018
techniques. However, the use of shaming is controversial: critics argue that delegating punishment to a crowd can lead to mob …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844573
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Network architecture and mutual monitoring in public goods experiments
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew - 2010
. -- experiment ; networks ; public good ; monitoring ; punishment …Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009300129
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Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew - In: Review of economic design : RED 16 (2012) 2/3, pp. 93-118
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009634559