What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...

This paper uses a principal-agent model to investigate how public school managers react to government incentives based on previous school performance. Using data from the Brazilian Student Evaluation Exam (Prova Brasil - PB) and the School Census, we estimate a managerial effort function by...

This paper uses a principal-agent model to investigate how public school managers react to government incentives based on previous school performance. Using data from the Brazilian Student Evaluation Exam (Prova Brasil -- PB) and the School Census, we estimate a managerial effort function by...

What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...

What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited...