In models of monetary policy, discretionary policymaking often lacks the ability to manage public beliefs, which explains the theoretical appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies. But as shown in this paper, when a policymaker possesses private information, belief management becomes an...

Monetary policy is most effective when public beliefs about future policies are actively managed. This is the appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies, typically absent under discretion. But when a policymaker has some private information - as is the case in reality - belief management...

Monetary policy is most effective when public beliefs about future policies are actively managed. This is the appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies, typically absent under discretion. But when a policymaker has some private information - as is the case in reality - belief management...

We study optimal nominal demand policy in an economy with monopolistic competition and flexible prices when firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. Parametrizing firms' information imperfections by a (Shannon) capacity parameter that constrains the amount of...

This paper examines the impact of public information in an economy where agents also have diverse private information. Since disclosures by central banks are an important source of public information, we are able to assess how the words of central bankers shape expectations, in addition to their...

This paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms' desired mark-ups. To minimize the welfare-reducing...

We depart from the common reaction function-based approach used to infer central bank preferences. Instead, we extract the tone from the textual information in the central bank communication using both a lexicon-based approach and a language model. We combine the tone with real-time information...

Using theoretical and empirical analyses, this paper shows that the expectation dynamics induced by information asymmetry between the Central Bank (CB) and the public can cause the price puzzle. The signalling and learning dynamics between the CB and a representative private-sector agent under...

Previous studies have stressed that in ation dynamics exhibit a substantial disper- sion across sectors. Using US producer price data, we present evidence that sectoral in ation persistence is negatively correlated with market concentration, which is diffi- cult to reconcile with the prediction...

This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary-discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time,...