Similar Search Results

Auctions vs. negotiations : the case of favoritism ; conference paper

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2013

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342227

Auctions vs. negotiations: The case of favoritism

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2012

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291548

Auctions vs. Negotiations : The Case of Favoritism

Gretschko, Vitali - 2013

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089156

Auctions vs. negotiations : the case of favoritism

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2012

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …. -- corruption ; auctions ; negotiations ; public procurement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689581

Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement

Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent - 2015

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A project's cost is private information and its value for the designer may vary. In this allocation problem, the selection of projects - both which and how many - is endogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491761

Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018

We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976063

Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement

Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent - 2017

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. Projects may differ in their value for the designer, and their cost is private information. In this allocation problem, the quantity of procured projects is endogenously determined...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697176

Procurement auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals

Balanquit, RM; Kimwell, MJM - 2016

Procurement auctions that assume independent private values (IPV) provide a benchmark for analysis that is readily …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582261

Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement

Meisner, Vincent; Jarman, Felix - In: Essays in microeconomic theory, (pp. 5-57). 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011633851

Collusion Detection in Public Procurement with Limited Information

Tas, Bedri Kamil Onur - 2018

collusion detection. We design a method to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions using limited information … implement the methodology to a unique data set of entire Turkish public procurement auctions in years 2004-2010, numbering 470 …,419. We uncover the structure of collusive behavior in Turkish public procurement auctions. We find that collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122567