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case. We show that in an insurance context, being insured against losses that may be incurred in a real-effort task changes … subjects' self-confidence. Our novel experimental design allows us to disentangle selection into insurance from the effects of … uninsured subjects are underconfident while those that obtain insurance have well-calibrated beliefs. Our results suggest that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011812974
case. We show that in an insurance context, being insured against losses that may be incurred in a real-effort task changes … subjects' self-confidence. Our novel experimental design allows us to disentangle selection into insurance from the effects of … uninsured subjects are underconfident while those that obtain insurance have well-calibrated beliefs. Our results suggest that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899247
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859563
This paper demonstrates the importance of simultaneously considering two behavioral biases, correlation neglect and overprecision, in characterizing belief formation. Our laboratory experiments reveal that, relative to independent signals, subjects overvalue moderately or strongly correlated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851813
We design an experiment to study how reversible entry decisions are affected by public and private payoff disclosure policies. In our environment, subjects choose between a risky payoff, which evolves according to an autoregressive process, and a constant outside option payoff. The treatments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211962
For two periods an expert E announces his forecast of the state to a decision-maker D who chooses action. They disagree about the precision of the probability assessments. At the end of period 1 the state is observed. In the last period E makes announcements more extreme than his forecasts....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014390247
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013450739
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013448173
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013468203
We examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In … positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse … selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303737