We begin with a supplier (she) who wholesales to a retailer (he), and is considering to encroach into the retail market …). Under the latter encroachment, the retailer may choose to share his private demand information with the supplier, but the … supplier must pay the retailer commission fees proportional to her direct sales revenue. In contrast, under the direct channel …

supplier privileged with private information about supply disruption risk. The supplier's initial reliability, asymmetric to … regime the payoff of either the high- or low-reliability supplier monotonically increases with their initial reliability … monotonically increase. By contrast, in the pull regime, the manufacturer's payoff will always increase, while the supplier's payoff …

– supplier selection. We find that the likelihood that a potential supplier (hereafter, a vendor) is selected to be an actual … supplier (hereafter, supplier) increases when personal connections between executives of the vendor and the customer exist. The …

When demand is uncertain and it is costly for the retailer to forecast demand information more accurately, the supplier … faces a moral hazard problem. The supplier wishes to induce the retailer to forecast more accurate information which will … which the supplier chooses the wholesale and buy-back price to maximize his profits given that the retailer's inventory …