The goal of this paper is to study how informational frictions affect asset liquidity in OTC markets in a laboratory setting. The experiments replicate an OTC market similar to the one used in monetary and financial economics (Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2005):...

We investigate how informational frictions affect trading in decentralized markets in theory and in a laboratory setting. Subjects, matched pairwise at random, trade divisible commodities that have different private values for a divisible asset with a common value (interpreted as money). We...

Using hedge funds' holdings of IPO stocks, we find that stocks with abnormally high hedge fund holdings, based on stock and deal characteristics, yield abnormal returns. Moreover, hedge funds are able to sell IPO stocks in a timely fashion before long-run underperforming periods start,...

We use a proprietary dataset to test the implications of several asymmetric information models on how short-lived private information affects trading strategies and liquidity provision. Our identification rests on information acquisition before analyst recommendations are publically announced....

Hard-to-value stocks provide opportunities for managers to exploit their informational advantage through trading on their firms' and their own personal accounts. In contrast to the prediction that such transactions reflect private information about future events, they are contrarian and heavily...

We develop a two-period general equilibrium model of portfolio delegation with competitive, differentially skilled managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but reduce price volatility. In particular, price...

I study a generalized OLG economy where asymmetrically informed agents have arbitrary investment horizons. As horizons increase, the age-adjusted risk aversion of investors fall, and the risk transfer from forced liquidators into voluntary buyers drops. Two equilibria coexist for long enough...

We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming — and investment efficiency is lower — when a greater fraction...

We study the choice of disclosure and share repurchase strategies of informed managers using a model that captures how they differentially impact short and long-term stock value. We identify a partial disclosure equilibrium in which firms in the lowest value region neither disclose nor...